WWBN AVideo
AVideo Weak PRNG Activation Code Authentication Bypass
AVideo through commit c3edcc274c389816d434acadac07ee78eaf330c1 uses a cryptographically weak pseudo-random number generator when creating account activation / login pairing codes. getRandomCode() in objects/functions.php derives the code entirely from uniqid() (sprintf('%08x%05x', seconds, microseconds)) with a single non-CSPRNG rand() character used only as padding, reducing the code space to roughly 36 x 10^6 (~2^25) values for a known generation second. Because plugin/API/set.json.php?APIName=login_code can be called without authentication, it also serves as an oracle for the server's exact microtime. An unauthenticated remote attacker who guesses a valid, unexpired code (codes expire after 10 minutes) can redeem it at plugin/API/get.json.php?APIName=login_code to obtain the target account's email address and a User::getUserHash(users_id, '+1 year') value, a credential accepted in place of the account password for one year, resulting in account takeover. No patched version is available.
Affected versions and mitigation
From the CVE record and the vendor's references.Affected
- <= c3edcc274c389816d434acadac07ee78eaf330c1
Mitigation
The record names no fix. Check the vendor advisory below.
References
- Vendor advisory github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHS…
Timeline
Days relative to CVE publicationNo public PoC found yet; not in CISA KEV.
PoC repositories
Found on GitHub.No PoC repositories found yet.