Team-alembic ash_authentication
OAuth2 sign-in attached to an existing account without an email comparison in AshAuthentication
Improper Authentication vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an attacker to be signed in as another user by linking an OAuth2 identity to an account that is not theirs. AshAuthentication.Strategy.OAuth2.UserResolver.resolve/3 matches an existing account using the register action's upsert_identity keys, then gates linking the incoming provider identity to it on email_trusted?/2, which reads only the provider's email_verified boolean and never compares the provider's email value with the matched account's email. That gate assumes the account was matched by its email field, so under any other upsert_identity it is vacuous and an attacker presenting their own verified email is attached to, and issued a session for, an account matched on some other attribute. The same unguarded gate applies in OAuth2.SignInPreparation on the registration_enabled? false path, where the account is matched by the sign-in action's read filter instead. The upsert also rewrites the matched account's email to the attacker's address, so later account recovery reaches the attacker rather than the owner. This issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.14.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.10 before 5.0.0-rc.14.
Affected versions and mitigation
From the CVE record and the vendor's references.Affected
- >= 4.14.0, < 4.15.0
- >= 5.0.0-rc.10, < 5.0.0-rc.14
Fixed in 4.15.0, 5.0.0-rc.14
- >= 42edcd8ebb13fafbb168f12591d7518ce0611fec, < 2bd630eef8b7c8ae1e90e8fd43ba12fbc7e256ba
- >= 64530644f9b37ebb76ca14aeb83a77597a0034b7, < 738bf9f32f2aa0d1bb92ce9ca5c2476cb5710459
Fixed in 2bd630eef8b7c8ae1e90e8fd43ba12fbc7e256ba, 738bf9f32f2aa0d1bb92ce9ca5c2476cb5710459
Mitigation
Upgrading prevents new links but does not unpick existing ones. An account already linked through this path stays linked, and a victim's email may already have been rewritten to the attacker's address. Operators whose register action or sign-in action matched on anything other than the email should review their UserIdentity rows for links whose provider email does not match the linked account's email, and check affected accounts for a rewritten email address.
Workaround
Set trust_email_verified? false on the affected strategy, which refuses the sign-in rather than linking it and closes both the register and the sign-in path. Alternatively, key the register action's upsert_identity, or the sign-in action's read filter, on the email attribute, which restores the premise the gate assumes.
References
Timeline
Days relative to CVE publicationNo public PoC found yet; not in CISA KEV.
PoC repositories
Found on GitHub.No PoC repositories found yet.