Cap-go capgo.app
Capgo SSO Provider Authentication Bypass via PostgREST Direct Write
Capgo (capgo.app) fails to restrict direct write access to the public.sso_providers table exposed through Supabase PostgREST. A holder of an ordinary Capgo full API key can insert a row with status='active' and enforce_sso=true, bypassing the intended backend SSO provisioning route (supabase/functions/_backend/private/sso/providers.ts) and its controls: the Enterprise plan requirement, SSO provider creation via the Supabase Management API, DNS TXT domain-ownership verification, the pending_verification → verified → active status transition, and issuance of a trusted provider ID by Supabase Auth. The forged row is trusted by SSO discovery and enforcement logic, including the unauthenticated login preflight endpoint /private/sso/check-domain, which then reports {"has_sso": true, "enforce_sso": true} for domains that were never verified, allowing attacker-controlled SSO enforcement to be asserted for arbitrary domains and disrupting normal login. All versions are affected; at the time of the advisory no patch was available.
Affected versions and mitigation
From the CVE record and the vendor's references.Affected
- <= *
Mitigation
The record names no fix. Check the vendor advisory below.
References
- Vendor advisory github.com/Cap-go/capgo.app/security/advisorie…
Timeline
Days relative to CVE publicationNo public PoC found yet; not in CISA KEV.
PoC repositories
Found on GitHub.No PoC repositories found yet.