Chartbrew
Chartbrew: Cross-tenant project takeover via body.team_id in /project routes
Chartbrew is an open-source web application that can connect directly to databases and APIs and use the data to create charts. Prior to 5.2.3, the shared project permission check trusted a caller-controlled team_id and let the teamOwner/teamAdmin branch continue without confirming that the target project belonged to that team. The vulnerable surface is project routes and related authorization checks that accepted user-controlled project identifiers. An authenticated user who is an owner or admin of their own team submits a victim project id together with the attacker's own team_id in the request body; default self-signup grants the required role on the user's own team. Authorization is evaluated against the attacker-selected team instead of the target project's team, and the update path mass-assigns the request body without a project field allow-list. The attacker needs a valid Chartbrew account, an owner or admin role on their own team, and a victim project identifier; requests without the body team_id trick are rejected. The attacker can re-parent the victim project into their own team, gain full read and write access, expose it publicly, remove password protection, and cause the victim to lose it; the shared delete route also permits cross-tenant deletion. This issue is fixed in version 5.2.3.
Affected versions and mitigation
From the CVE record and the vendor's references.Affected
- < 5.2.3
Fixed in 5.2.3
Mitigation
Upgrade chartbrew to 5.2.3 or later.
References
- Vendor advisory github.com/chartbrew/chartbrew/security/adviso…
- Patch github.com/chartbrew/chartbrew/commit/9db1e57c…
- Release notes github.com/chartbrew/chartbrew/releases/tag/v5…
Timeline
Days relative to CVE publicationNo public PoC found yet; not in CISA KEV.
PoC repositories
Found on GitHub.No PoC repositories found yet.