MISP
Session Fixation in MISP CustomAuth Authentication Allows Session Hijacking
MISP contains a session fixation vulnerability in the CustomAuth authentication (a custom configuration) flow. When a user was successfully authenticated through CustomAuth, MISP stored the authenticated user identity in the existing session without first rotating the session identifier. As a result, if an attacker can cause a victim to use a session identifier known to the attacker before authentication, that same session identifier remains valid after the victim successfully authenticates. The attacker could subsequently reuse the fixed session identifier to access the victim's authenticated MISP session, potentially gaining the privileges associated with the victim's account. The issue occurs because __customAuthentication() wrote the authenticated user into the existing CakePHP session while the call to Session->renew() had previously been disabled. The patch restores session identifier rotation when a new authentication occurs or when the authenticated user changes, while avoiding unnecessary session renewal on every request.
Affected versions and mitigation
From the CVE record and the vendor's references.Affected
- <= 2.5.45
Mitigation
The record names no fix. Check the vendor advisory below.
References
Timeline
Days relative to CVE publicationNo public PoC found yet; not in CISA KEV.
PoC repositories
Found on GitHub.No PoC repositories found yet.