Tw93 Pake
Pake arbitrary file write via unsanitized download_file filename
Pake before 3.13.1 joins the JavaScript-supplied filename for the download_file Tauri command onto the user's Downloads directory with no sanitization. A filename containing path traversal sequences (for example ../Library/LaunchAgents/com.evil.plist) or an absolute path resolves outside ~/Downloads. The command then fetches attacker-controlled content from the supplied URL (via Rust HTTP, not the browser) and writes it to that path. A script that can invoke the command can overwrite user-writable files and install persistence (macOS LaunchAgents, Linux autostart, Windows Startup), leading to code execution in the user account. All desktop apps generated from an affected Pake tree expose the same command.
Affected versions and mitigation
From the CVE record and the vendor's references.Affected
- < 3.13.1
Fixed in 3.13.1
Mitigation
Upgrade Pake to 3.13.1 or later and rebuild generated apps from that tree. The fix introduces sanitize_download_filename and uses only the final path segment before joining onto the Downloads directory, so ../ and absolute paths cannot escape that directory.
References
- Patch github.com/tw93/Pake/commit/a5463a84d6e36705ee…
- Vendor advisory github.com/tw93/Pake/releases/tag/V3.13.1
Timeline
Days relative to CVE publicationNo public PoC found yet; not in CISA KEV.
PoC repositories
Found on GitHub.No PoC repositories found yet.