Ash-project ash_ai
Identity tool filter in AshAi accepts operator maps, allowing update or destroy of unidentified records
Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_ai allows a caller of an identity-configured tool to update or destroy records it never identified, including every row in the table. In AshAi.Tool.Execution, identity_filter/3 built the update/destroy filter directly from the raw tool arguments as [{key, Map.get(arguments, to_string(key))}] and passed it to Ash.Query.do_filter/2. A map value is parsed as a predicate expression rather than a literal, so a caller can send {"public_ref": {"not_eq": "<own-ref>"}} and, combined with Ash.Query.limit(1) and Ash.bulk_update!/Ash.bulk_destroy!, retarget the write at a record it never identified; an omitted key yields an IS NULL filter that matches an arbitrary row. The fix casts each identity value to the field type, rejecting non-scalar inputs. This issue affects ash_ai: from 0.6.0 before 1.0.0.
Affected versions and mitigation
From the CVE record and the vendor's references.Affected
- >= 0.6.0, < 1.0.0
Fixed in 1.0.0
- >= bc2122f78fca6c11d8ec2b9ac53148ec17476460, < 87f616d5bfbf7af43346f0701ae17f853789a602
Fixed in 87f616d5bfbf7af43346f0701ae17f853789a602
Mitigation
Upgrade ash_ai to 1.0.0 or later.
Upgrade ash_ai to 87f616d5bfbf7af43346f0701ae17f853789a602 or later.
References
Timeline
Days relative to CVE publicationNo public PoC found yet; not in CISA KEV.
PoC repositories
Found on GitHub.No PoC repositories found yet.