Tornado
Tornado: Urlencoded body parsing omits max_num_fields, so one request can stall the event loop
Tornado is a Python web framework and asynchronous networking library. Prior to 6.5.8, Tornado parses application/x-www-form-urlencoded request bodies with urllib.parse.parse_qs in tornado/escape.py without passing max_num_fields. RequestHandler._execute in tornado/web.py parses the body before handler dispatch through HTTPServerRequest._parse_body and parse_body_arguments in tornado/httputil.py, so an unauthenticated request body containing millions of separator-delimited fields can synchronously stall the single-threaded event loop and delay every connection. The body is bounded only by max_buffer_size, which defaults to 104857600 bytes. This issue is fixed in version 6.5.8.
Affected versions and mitigation
From the CVE record and the vendor's references.Affected
- < 6.5.8
Fixed in 6.5.8
Mitigation
Upgrade tornado to 6.5.8 or later.
References
- Vendor advisory github.com/tornadoweb/tornado/security/advisor…
- Patch github.com/tornadoweb/tornado/pull/3704
- Patch github.com/tornadoweb/tornado/commit/8d6363ed7…
1 more
- Release notes github.com/tornadoweb/tornado/releases/tag/v6.…
Timeline
Days relative to CVE publicationNo public PoC found yet; not in CISA KEV.
PoC repositories
Found on GitHub.No PoC repositories found yet.