Ash-project ash_ai
MCP DNS-rebinding origin check in AshAi is bypassed by a spoofed X-Forwarded-Proto header
Origin Validation Error vulnerability in ash-project ash_ai allows a malicious web page to bypass the MCP server's DNS-rebinding protection and issue cross-site requests to a user's local MCP server with that user's actor. In AshAi.Mcp.Server, with the default allowed_origins: nil, origin_allowed?/3 accepts an origin when uri.host == conn.host and the forwarded scheme is https. Both values are attacker-controlled: conn.host comes from the Host header and the scheme is read from the raw x-forwarded-proto header with no trusted-proxy check. Under DNS rebinding the browser sends the attacker's origin and a matching host, and page JavaScript may set X-Forwarded-Proto: https, so the check passes with no TLS or proxy involved. The fix trusts only localhost origins by default; other origins require an explicit allowed_origins allowlist. This issue affects ash_ai: from 0.8.0 before 1.0.0.
Affected versions and mitigation
From the CVE record and the vendor's references.Affected
- >= 0.8.0, < 1.0.0
Fixed in 1.0.0
- >= c94f0b17fbe252f68755ba512678586164ba6139, < 28af68d73134df0b8fb3aa6ab03e8fd795b07c21
Fixed in 28af68d73134df0b8fb3aa6ab03e8fd795b07c21
Mitigation
Upgrade ash_ai to 1.0.0 or later.
Upgrade ash_ai to 28af68d73134df0b8fb3aa6ab03e8fd795b07c21 or later.
References
Timeline
Days relative to CVE publicationNo public PoC found yet; not in CISA KEV.
PoC repositories
Found on GitHub.No PoC repositories found yet.