Zephyr
Path traversal in Zephyr HTTP server static-filesystem resource handler allows unauthenticated remote arbitrary file read
Zephyr's HTTP server (subsys/net/lib/http) provides a static-filesystem resource type (HTTP_RESOURCE_TYPE_STATIC_FS, available when CONFIG_FILE_SYSTEM is enabled) that serves files from a configured root directory. Before this fix, both the HTTP/1 and HTTP/2 front-ends placed the raw, attacker-controlled request path into client->url_buffer (assembled in on_url() for HTTP/1 and copied verbatim from the :path pseudo-header for HTTP/2) without resolving ./.. segments. The static-FS handler then built the on-disk filename by directly concatenating the configured root with that raw URL (snprintk(fname, ..., "%s%s", static_fs_detail->fs_path, client->url_buffer) at http_server_http1.c:603 and http_server_http2.c:490) and opened it with fs_open(fname, FS_O_READ). Because the handler is reached via wildcard/leading-dir (fnmatch FNM_LEADING_DIR) or fallback resource matching, a request such as GET /<prefix>/../../<file> is dispatched to the handler and, after the underlying filesystem (e.g. LittleFS/FAT) resolves the .. segments, escapes the configured web root, letting an unauthenticated remote client read arbitrary readable files on the mounted volume (information disclosure). The HTTP server requires no TLS or authentication to reach this path. The fix adds http_server_remove_dot_segments(), which canonicalizes the path portion of the URL before resource lookup in both protocol handlers, neutralizing the traversal. Affects releases v4.0.0 through v4.4.0 for deployments that register a static-filesystem resource.
Affected versions and mitigation
From the CVE record and the vendor's references.Affected
- >= 4.0.0, < 4.6.0
Fixed in 4.6.0
Mitigation
Upgrade zephyr to 4.6.0 or later.
References
Timeline
Days relative to CVE publicationFirst public PoC 49 days before publication; not in CISA KEV. First PoC: ret2c/CVE-2026-8023 (created 11 May 2026, found by us: backfilled).
PoC repositories
Found on GitHub.1 PoCs
PoCs 1
| Repository | Created | Stars | Assessment |
|---|---|---|---|
| ret2c/CVE-2026-8023 | 11 May 2026 −49 d | 0 | PoC |
Only PoCs count toward the first-PoC date and the characteristics below. Do not run PoC code from unknown sources.
PoC characteristics
What to hunt for in your logs · from 1 PoC repoGET /www/../device.env
- Seen in
- 1 repo: ret2c/CVE-2026-8023
- Evidence
- ret2c/CVE-2026-8023/README.md:16 ret2c/CVE-2026-8023/README.md:17
Regex
Generated from PoC characteristics; not yet reviewed. Matches the request path and query.
(?i)^/www/\.\./device\.env(?:[?#].*)?$
Suricata
Template generated from PoC characteristics. Review before deploying.
alert http any any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"GG PoC-Monitor CVE-2026-8023 zephyrproject zephyr exploit attempt"; flow:established,to_server; http.method; content:"GET"; http.uri; content:"/www/../device.env"; reference:url,poc.griffinguard.io/cve/CVE-2026-8023; classtype:web-application-attack; sid:9081337; rev:1;)
Sigma
Template generated from PoC characteristics. Review before deploying.
title: zephyrproject zephyr exploit attempt (CVE-2026-8023)
id: gg-pocmon-cve-2026-8023-9081337
status: experimental
description: Request pattern taken from public PoCs for CVE-2026-8023. Generated, not reviewed.
references:
- https://poc.griffinguard.io/cve/CVE-2026-8023
logsource:
category: webserver
detection:
selection:
cs-method: GET
cs-uri-stem|contains|all:
- '/www/../device.env'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Authorized vulnerability scanning
level: high
tags:
- attack.initial_access
- attack.t1190
- cve.2026.8023