Team-alembic ash_authentication
Sign-in token minted for one resource accepted by another in AshAuthentication
Improper Authentication vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an attacker holding a sign-in token for one authenticated resource to be signed in as a user of a different resource. AshAuthentication.Strategy.Password.SignInWithTokenPreparation.extract_primary_keys_from_subject/2 parses the JWT sub claim (for example user?id=1) with URI.parse/1 and keeps only its query string, discarding the path segment that names the subject the token was issued for. Nothing else restores that binding: AshAuthentication.Jwt.verify/3 checks the signature, exp, nbf, jti and the library-version claims, the purpose check only requires sign_in, and the remaining comparison is over primary-key field names, which are identical across resources. The WebAuthn sign-in and remember-me preparations carry copies of the same helper and drop the path in the same way. The magic link sign-in path pins the subject name against the resource and is not affected. This issue affects ash_authentication: from 3.10.5 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.
Affected versions and mitigation
From the CVE record and the vendor's references.Affected
- >= 3.10.5, < 4.15.0
- >= 5.0.0-rc.0, < 5.0.0-rc.14
Fixed in 4.15.0, 5.0.0-rc.14
- >= eca8cadea0f1595ed2c10a0c177b1da9aa9e5269, < *
Fixed in *, 2640e1872e1fef4e4606e601bf00102cff784c03, 7baac243ca651eee127a84d672eee3fcff42e598
Mitigation
Upgrade ash_authentication to 4.15.0 or 5.0.0-rc.14 or later.
Upgrade ash_authentication to * or 2640e1872e1fef4e4606e601bf00102cff784c03 or 7baac243ca651eee127a84d672eee3fcff42e598 or later.
References
- Vendor advisory github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/sec…
- Patch github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/com…
- Patch github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/com…
1 more
Timeline
Days relative to CVE publicationNo public PoC found yet; not in CISA KEV.
PoC repositories
Found on GitHub.No PoC repositories found yet.