OpenStack Keystone
In OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3, any authenticated user holding role:reader on any project can list every project-scoped role assignment under any domain by passing a domain ID as scope.project.id with include_subtree to the GET /v3/role_assignments endpoint. The domain's project record has domain_id=null, causing the policy domain_id check to pass for any caller. With include_names, the response discloses the names and home-domain IDs of every user, group, project, and role involved. The literal "default" domain ID works against any deployment created with keystone-manage bootstrap. An attacker can harvest domain IDs from the response and repeat the query to map role assignments across the entire cloud. This is caused by misuse of "None" in list_role_assignments_for_tree.
Affected versions and mitigation
From the CVE record and the vendor's references.Affected
- >= 16.0.0, < 27.0.3
- >= 28.0.0, < 28.0.3
- >= 29.0.0, < 29.0.3
Fixed in 27.0.3, 28.0.3, 29.0.3
Mitigation
Upgrade Keystone to 27.0.3 or 28.0.3 or 29.0.3 or later.
Timeline
Days relative to CVE publicationNo public PoC found yet; not in CISA KEV.
PoC repositories
Found on GitHub.No PoC repositories found yet.