Xen
x86: XPTI may break on huge-memory systems
XPTI (Xen Page Table Isolation) was introduced to mitigate Meltdown (CVE-2017-5754, one aspect of XSA-254). This involves copying 64-bit PV guest page table entries from guest-chosen root page tables to the Xen- chosen one which is in actual use by hardware. To read the guest root page table, the directmap is used. PV guests, however, have a directmap which may not cover all memory; in particular this is the case if any memory extends beyond the 5 TiB (CONFIG_BIGMEM=y: 3.5 TiB) address boundary.
Affected versions and mitigation
From the CVE record and the vendor's references.Mitigation
The record names no fix. Check the vendor advisory below.
Workaround
Not running 64-bit PV guests will avoid the vulnerability. The "mem=" hypervisor command line option may be used to limit the amount of memory Xen is going to use. That would be "mem=5T" for the CONFIG_BIGMEM=n case and "mem=3584G" for the CONFIG_BIGMEM=y one.
Timeline
Days relative to CVE publicationNo public PoC found yet; not in CISA KEV.
PoC repositories
Found on GitHub.No PoC repositories found yet.