Flytohub flyto-core
Flyto2 Core: SSRF guard bypass via DNS rebinding (validate_url_ssrf resolves-then-connects without pinning)
Flyto2 Core is an execution kernel for automation and AI-agent workflows. Prior to 2.26.8, validate_url_ssrf() in src/core/utils.py validates one DNS answer and then returns the hostname, while guarded_aiohttp_request(), enforce_outbound_url(), and validate_url_with_env_config() allow the outbound connection to perform an independent second lookup. A caller with control of the hostname's DNS can make validation see a public address and make the connection see an internal address, bypassing the guard across its outbound consumers and exposing readable internal or metadata-service responses. The attack requires low or zero DNS TTL behavior and a successful timing-dependent answer change; static multiple-address answers are checked and do not provide the same bypass. This issue is fixed in version 2.26.8.
Affected versions and mitigation
From the CVE record and the vendor's references.Affected
- < 2.26.8
Fixed in 2.26.8
Mitigation
Upgrade flyto-core to 2.26.8 or later.
References
- Vendor advisory github.com/flytohub/flyto-core/security/adviso…
- Patch github.com/flytohub/flyto-core/commit/bf748df8…
- Release notes github.com/flytohub/flyto-core/releases/tag/v2…
Timeline
Days relative to CVE publicationFirst public PoC 1.4 days after publication; not in CISA KEV. First PoC: googlesky/CVE-2026-77316 (created 21 Nov 2026, found by us: 21 Nov 2026).
PoC repositories
Found on GitHub.1 PoCs
PoCs 1
| Repository | Created | Found by us | Stars | Assessment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| googlesky/CVE-2026-77316 | 21 Nov 2026 +1.4 d | 21 Nov 2026 | 0 | Scanner |
Only PoCs count toward the first-PoC date and the characteristics below. Do not run PoC code from unknown sources.