RAGFlow
RAGFlow < 0.26.3 - Server-Side Request Forgery via Agent Invoke Component
RAGFlow before 0.26.3 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the agent workflow "Invoke" component (agent/component/invoke.py). The component builds an outbound request URL from canvas configuration and runtime template variables and passes it to requests.get, requests.post, or requests.put without calling the shared assert_url_is_safe validator or pinning the resolved address, unlike the crawler, SearXNG, file-upload, and RSS fetch paths. A user who can create or trigger an agent can direct the server to fetch loopback, link-local, and RFC 1918 destinations, including cloud instance metadata endpoints and services co-located on the deployment network, and the response body is returned as the component output. Where an agent is configured to interpolate the chat query into the Invoke URL, the destination is chosen by whoever can send that query.
Affected versions and mitigation
From the CVE record and the vendor's references.Affected
- < 0.26.3
Fixed in 0.26.3
Mitigation
Upgrade ragflow to 0.26.3 or later.
References
Timeline
Days relative to CVE publicationFirst public PoC 8.4 days after publication; not in CISA KEV. First PoC: t3bik/CVE-2026-75898 (created 26 Aug 2026, found by us: backfilled).
PoC repositories
Found on GitHub.1 PoCs
PoCs 1
| Repository | Created | Stars | Assessment |
|---|---|---|---|
| t3bik/CVE-2026-75898 | 26 Aug 2026 +8.4 d | 0 | PoC
Flags · score 30
Below the suspicion threshold (50); does not change the assessment. |
Only PoCs count toward the first-PoC date and the characteristics below. Do not run PoC code from unknown sources.
PoC characteristics
What to hunt for in your logs · from 1 PoC repoPOST /api/v1/agents/{var}/components/invoke1/debug
- Key headers
Authorization: {var}- Body markers
"params"inapplication/json- Ports
- 9380, 9381, 13880, 13881
- Seen in
- 1 repo: t3bik/CVE-2026-75898
- Evidence
- t3bik/CVE-2026-75898/LAB_DEMO.md:54
Regex
Generated from PoC characteristics; not yet reviewed. Matches the request path and query.
(?i)^/api/v1/agents/[^/?#]*/components/invoke1/debug(?:[?#].*)?$
Suricata
Template generated from PoC characteristics. Review before deploying.
alert http any any -> $HOME_NET [9380,9381,13880,13881] (msg:"GG PoC-Monitor CVE-2026-75898 infiniflow ragflow exploit attempt"; flow:established,to_server; http.method; content:"POST"; http.uri; content:"/components/invoke1/debug"; http.uri; content:"/api/v1/agents/"; http.header_names; content:"Authorization"; nocase; http.request_body; content:"|22|params|22|"; reference:url,poc.griffinguard.io/cve/CVE-2026-75898; classtype:web-application-attack; sid:9206029; rev:1;)
Sigma
Template generated from PoC characteristics. Review before deploying.
title: infiniflow ragflow exploit attempt (CVE-2026-75898)
id: gg-pocmon-cve-2026-75898-9206029
status: experimental
description: Request pattern taken from public PoCs for CVE-2026-75898. Generated, not reviewed.
references:
- https://poc.griffinguard.io/cve/CVE-2026-75898
logsource:
category: webserver
detection:
selection:
cs-method: POST
cs-uri-stem|contains|all:
- '/components/invoke1/debug'
- '/api/v1/agents/'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Authorized vulnerability scanning
level: high
tags:
- attack.initial_access
- attack.t1190
- cve.2026.75898