Netty
Netty: SNI Routing Bypass via Fragmented TLS ClientHello Causing Fallback to Default SslContext
Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.1.137.Fina and 4.2.17.Final, io.netty.handler.ssl.SslClientHelloHandler#decode checks the wrong offset before reading the four-byte TLS handshake header, so a ClientHello whose handshake header spans records can cause an IndexOutOfBoundsException and invoke select(ctx, null). This selects the default SslContext instead of the SNI-specific context. In deployments where per-SNI clientAuth=REQUIRE is the sole mutual TLS gate, the default SslContext uses clientAuth=NONE or clientAuth=OPTIONAL, and no application-layer certificate verification exists, an unauthenticated remote attacker can bypass the protected route's mutual TLS requirement. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.137.Final and 4.2.17.Final.
Affected versions and mitigation
From the CVE record and the vendor's references.Affected
- < 4.1.137.Final
- >= 4.2.0.Final, < 4.2.17.Final
Fixed in 4.1.137.Final, 4.2.17.Final
Mitigation
Upgrade netty to 4.1.137.Final or 4.2.17.Final or later.
References
Timeline
Days relative to CVE publicationNo public PoC found yet; not in CISA KEV.
PoC repositories
Found on GitHub.No PoC repositories found yet.