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CVE-2026-75595published 19 Aug 2026 21:00 UTCData: JSON · API

Netty

Netty: SNI Routing Bypass via Fragmented TLS ClientHello Causing Fallback to Default SslContext

Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.1.137.Fina and 4.2.17.Final, io.netty.handler.ssl.SslClientHelloHandler#decode checks the wrong offset before reading the four-byte TLS handshake header, so a ClientHello whose handshake header spans records can cause an IndexOutOfBoundsException and invoke select(ctx, null). This selects the default SslContext instead of the SNI-specific context. In deployments where per-SNI clientAuth=REQUIRE is the sole mutual TLS gate, the default SslContext uses clientAuth=NONE or clientAuth=OPTIONAL, and no application-layer certificate verification exists, an unauthenticated remote attacker can bypass the protected route's mutual TLS requirement. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.137.Final and 4.2.17.Final.

First public PoC None yetno public PoC found
Public PoCs00 on GitHub
CVSS9.1critical · scored by CNA · CWE-754
CISA KEV Not listednot known exploited

Affected versions and mitigation

From the CVE record and the vendor's references.

Affected

netty netty
  • < 4.1.137.Final
  • >= 4.2.0.Final, < 4.2.17.Final

Fixed in 4.1.137.Final, 4.2.17.Final

Timeline

Days relative to CVE publication
-2t=0+2+4+6+8CVE published19 Aug 2026 · t = 0

No public PoC found yet; not in CISA KEV.

PoC repositories

Found on GitHub.

No PoC repositories found yet.