Envoy
Envoy: HTTP RBAC safe_regex can fail open on RFC-valid obs-text header values
Envoy is an open source edge and service proxy designed for cloud-native applications. Prior to 1.36.10, 1.37.6, 1.38.4, and 1.39.1, Envoy HTTP RBAC accepts RFC-valid opaque header bytes but evaluates safe_regex values with RE2's UTF-8 subject semantics. A downstream client can preserve a prohibited marker and add an unrelated obs-text octet, causing RE2::FullMatch to return false and a negative RBAC policy to treat the invalid subject as an ordinary no-match. A byte-oriented route matcher can still observe the marker, allowing the request to reach a route intended to be denied. The relevant scope boundary is that plain positive ALLOW regexes normally fail closed, and exact, prefix, suffix, and contains matchers are not shown to have this subject-domain failure. This issue is fixed in versions 1.36.10, 1.37.6, 1.38.4, and 1.39.1.
Affected versions and mitigation
From the CVE record and the vendor's references.Affected
- < 1.36.10
- >= 1.37.0, < 1.37.6
- >= 1.38.0, < 1.38.4
- >= 1.39.0, < 1.39.1
Fixed in 1.36.10, 1.37.6, 1.38.4, 1.39.1
Mitigation
Upgrade envoy to 1.36.10 or 1.37.6 or 1.38.4 or 1.39.1 or later.
References
- Vendor advisory github.com/envoyproxy/envoy/security/advisorie…
- Patch github.com/envoyproxy/envoy/commit/5650cb9770d…
- Patch github.com/envoyproxy/envoy/commit/7d1dee5dda6…
5 more
Timeline
Days relative to CVE publicationNo public PoC found yet; not in CISA KEV.
PoC repositories
Found on GitHub.No PoC repositories found yet.