PoC Monitor
← All CVEs
CVE-2026-72444published 15 Aug 2026 05:56 UTCData: JSON · API

Linux

flow_dissector: check device type before reading ETH_ADDRS

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: flow_dissector: check device type before reading ETH_ADDRS __skb_flow_dissect() unconditionally reads 12 bytes from eth_hdr(skb) when FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_ETH_ADDRS is requested. This assumes the skb has a valid Ethernet header at mac_header, which is not always the case. The problem can be triggered by: 1. Creating a TUN device in L3 mode (IFF_TUN, hard_header_len=0) 2. Attaching a multiq qdisc with a flower filter matching on eth_src 3. Sending a packet through AF_PACKET Since TUN in L3 mode has no link-layer header, mac_header points to the L3 data area. The flow dissector reads 12 bytes of uninitialized skb memory, which then propagates through fl_set_masked_key() and is used as a rhashtable lookup key in __fl_lookup(), as reported by KMSAN. Rejecting the filter in the control path (at tc filter add time) is not feasible because TC filter blocks can be shared between arbitrary devices -- a filter installed on an Ethernet device may later classify packets on a headerless device through a shared block. The device association is not fixed at filter creation time. Fix this by gating the memcpy on dev->type == ARPHRD_ETHER, which ensures only true Ethernet-framed packets have their addresses read. This is more precise than the previous hard_header_len >= 12 check, which would incorrectly pass for non-Ethernet link types like IPoIB (ARPHRD_INFINIBAND, hard_header_len=24) and FDDI (hard_header_len=21) whose L2 headers are not in Ethernet format. Additionally check skb_mac_header_was_set() to guard against the pathological case where mac_header is the unset sentinel (~0U), which would cause eth_hdr() to return a wild pointer. For the act_mirred redirect case (Ethernet packet redirected to a non-Ethernet device sharing a TC block), zeroing the key is the correct behavior: the packet is now being classified on the target device, where Ethernet address matching is not semantically meaningful. Note: on non-Ethernet devices, the zeroed key will match a filter configured with all-zero MAC addresses. This is an improvement over the previous behavior where uninitialized memory could randomly match any filter.

First public PoC None yetno public PoC found
Public PoCs00 on GitHub
CVSS7.8high · scored by CNA
CISA KEV Not listednot known exploited

Affected versions and mitigation

From the CVE record and the vendor's references.

Affected

Linux Linux
  • >= 67a900cc0436d74e7ff89042371760def087680d, < 0fe6455b8e1a22414f39c07bc90a1df12b52ec74
  • >= 67a900cc0436d74e7ff89042371760def087680d, < 9a65860959db594dfc1820c7fdc09285fb7556bf
  • >= 67a900cc0436d74e7ff89042371760def087680d, < 594c90b197141944f25991b8314de5c26ee27a7e
  • >= 67a900cc0436d74e7ff89042371760def087680d, < c6d3bcb0f934d4297ac5fa1c8656ae40694fb601
  • >= 67a900cc0436d74e7ff89042371760def087680d, < 825de39f0c35a112148799b3cbe45af3766c018a
  • >= 67a900cc0436d74e7ff89042371760def087680d, < bf6e8af2c8be77489bedeae9f8a9654cb710e500

Fixed in 0fe6455b8e1a22414f39c07bc90a1df12b52ec74, 9a65860959db594dfc1820c7fdc09285fb7556bf, 594c90b197141944f25991b8314de5c26ee27a7e, c6d3bcb0f934d4297ac5fa1c8656ae40694fb601, 825de39f0c35a112148799b3cbe45af3766c018a, bf6e8af2c8be77489bedeae9f8a9654cb710e500

Linux Linux
  • 4.2

Fixed in 0, 6.1.178, 6.6.145, 6.12.97, 6.18.40, 7.1.5, 7.2

Mitigation

Upgrade Linux to 0fe6455b8e1a22414f39c07bc90a1df12b52ec74 or 9a65860959db594dfc1820c7fdc09285fb7556bf or 594c90b197141944f25991b8314de5c26ee27a7e or c6d3bcb0f934d4297ac5fa1c8656ae40694fb601 or 825de39f0c35a112148799b3cbe45af3766c018a or bf6e8af2c8be77489bedeae9f8a9654cb710e500 or later.

Upgrade Linux to 0 or 6.1.178 or 6.6.145 or 6.12.97 or 6.18.40 or 7.1.5 or 7.2 or later.

Timeline

Days relative to CVE publication
-2t=0+2+4+6+8CVE published15 Aug 2026 · t = 0

No public PoC found yet; not in CISA KEV.

PoC repositories

Found on GitHub.

No PoC repositories found yet.