Gitea
Gitea repository migration SSRF through DNS rebinding
Gitea validates a repository migration hostname against its network allow and block lists before invoking Git, but the Git subprocess independently resolves the hostname when connecting. An attacker who can start a migration and control the destination's DNS can change the address between validation and connection to reach a blocked internal address. The affected path is the Git clone operation; validation in the migration HTTP client's dialer does not protect the independently connecting Git subprocess.
First public PoC
None yetno public PoC found
Public PoCs00 on GitHub
CVSS7.5high · scored by CISA ADP · CWE-918
CISA KEV
Not listednot known exploited
Affected versions and mitigation
From the CVE record and the vendor's references.Affected
Gitea Gitea
- <= 1.27.3
Mitigation
The record names no fix. Check the vendor advisory below.
References
- Vendor advisory github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/…
- Patch github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/39426
- Release notes blog.gitea.com/release-of-28.0.0
1 more
- Release notes github.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v28.0.0
Timeline
Days relative to CVE publicationNo public PoC found yet; not in CISA KEV.
PoC repositories
Found on GitHub.No PoC repositories found yet.