Heym
Heym: Command execution via POST /api/mcp/fetch-tools stdio transport: supplied command is spawned before MCP validation
Heym builds and runs agentic systems and business-process automations on self-hosted infrastructure. Prior to version 0.0.75, the same POST /api/mcp/fetch-tools endpoint (any authenticated user, lowest role) also accepts the stdio transport, which spawns the attacker-supplied command with attacker-supplied args and an environment merged over os.environ. The process executes on the shared backend host before MCP protocol validation fails — so side effects fire regardless of whether the command speaks MCP. This is a distinct weakness class and exploit primitive from the SSRF (Advisory 2) on the same endpoint, and needs a different fix (role gating / opt-in trust boundary rather than egress controls). This issue has been patched in version 0.0.75.
Affected versions and mitigation
From the CVE record and the vendor's references.Affected
- < 0.0.75
Fixed in 0.0.75
Mitigation
Upgrade heym to 0.0.75 or later.
References
- Vendor advisory github.com/heymrun/heym/security/advisories/GH…
- Patch github.com/heymrun/heym/commit/22b8ee60eb92128…
- Patch github.com/heymrun/heym/commit/6c6213f88dfa8b2…
1 more
- Release notes github.com/heymrun/heym/releases/tag/v0.0.75
Timeline
Days relative to CVE publicationNo public PoC found yet; not in CISA KEV.
PoC repositories
Found on GitHub.No PoC repositories found yet.