Heym
Heym Unsandboxed skill code execution: skills run via a local backend subprocess without the Docker isolation that Python tools mandate
Heym builds and runs agentic systems and business-process automations on self-hosted infrastructure. Prior to version 0.0.70, heym hardens one untrusted-code path but not its sibling. The Python tool executor (python_tool_executor.py) treats user code as untrusted and mandates a Docker sandbox (no network, read-only fs, non-root, no docker socket), failing closed. The skill executor (skill_python_executor.py) runs skill Python via a local backend subprocess with no Docker isolation — only a 512 MB RLIMIT and a 7-key env denylist — so a skill executes inside the backend execution context, with filesystem access, network egress, and non-denylisted environment variables that should not be exposed to untrusted/shared skills. In the shipped Docker config (backend runs as root + /var/run/docker.sock mounted), this escalates to host root. This issue has been patched in version 0.0.70.
Affected versions and mitigation
From the CVE record and the vendor's references.Affected
- < 0.0.70
Fixed in 0.0.70
Mitigation
Upgrade heym to 0.0.70 or later.
References
- Vendor advisory github.com/heymrun/heym/security/advisories/GH…
- Patch github.com/heymrun/heym/commit/2155057f4153a1e…
- Patch github.com/heymrun/heym/commit/28bb2901e4dea12…
1 more
- Release notes github.com/heymrun/heym/releases/tag/0.0.70
Timeline
Days relative to CVE publicationNo public PoC found yet; not in CISA KEV.
PoC repositories
Found on GitHub.No PoC repositories found yet.