RabbitMQ rabbitmq-server
RabbitMQ: Atom-table exhaustion via reply-to queue name decoding
RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 4.2.7 and 4.3.1, rabbit_pid_codec:decompose_from_binary/1 parses a caller-supplied ETF-encoded binary and calls binary_to_atom(Node, utf8) on the node-name field. It is reached from rabbit_volatile_queue:pid_from_name/2, which is invoked for any queue name / routing key beginning amq.rabbitmq.reply-to.. The CandidateNodes membership check happens after the atom is created, and the surrounding try/catch cannot reclaim atoms (they are never GC'd). binary_to_existing_atom is not used. Any authenticated AMQP client can crash the entire Erlang VM (all vhosts, all connections) with ~1M cheap requests. Preconditions include Authenticated AMQP 0-9-1 connection to any vhost No per-connection rate limit low enough to make ~1M operations infeasible. This issue is fixed in versions 4.2.7 and 4.3.1.
Affected versions and mitigation
From the CVE record and the vendor's references.Affected
- >= 4.2.0, < 4.2.7
- >= 4.3.0, < 4.3.1
Fixed in 4.2.7, 4.3.1
Mitigation
Upgrade rabbitmq-server to 4.2.7 or 4.3.1 or later.
References
- Vendor advisory github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server/security/a…
- Release notes github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server/releases/t…
- Release notes github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server/releases/t…
Timeline
Days relative to CVE publicationNo public PoC found yet; not in CISA KEV.
PoC repositories
Found on GitHub.No PoC repositories found yet.