PgBouncer
Integer overflow causes an infinite loop in packet buffer growth in PgBouncer
Integer overflow in the packet buffer growth logic in PgBouncer through 1.25.2 allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause a denial of service. Sufficiently large input makes the buffer size computation overflow, leaving the growth loop unable to terminate. Because PgBouncer serves all clients from a single process, this saturates a CPU core and stalls every pooled connection until the process is killed. Both unauthenticated and authenticated code paths can reach the overflow.
Affected versions and mitigation
From the CVE record and the vendor's references.Affected
- <= 1.25.2
Mitigation
The record names no fix. Check the vendor advisory below.
Workaround
Set max_packet_size well below 1073741824 so that no single packet can grow a packet buffer past the overflow threshold
References
- Release notes pgbouncer.org/changelog.html
Timeline
Days relative to CVE publicationNo public PoC found yet; not in CISA KEV.
PoC repositories
Found on GitHub.No PoC repositories found yet.