OpenEMR
OpenEMR FaxSMS module: insecure staging of decrypted patient documents in webroot
OpenEMR is a free and open source electronic health records and medical practice management application. Prior to 8.2.0, interface/modules/custom_modules/oe-module-faxsms/src/Controller/SignalWireClient.php decrypts a selected patient document with Document::get_data() and SignalWireClient::uploadFileForFax() writes the plaintext bytes under sites/{siteId}/fax. The module returns the resulting public URL to SignalWire, protects it only with a predictable uniqid() filename, and never removes the staged file. An unauthenticated network actor who obtains or guesses the URL can retrieve persistent patient documents even when drive encryption is enabled. This issue is fixed in version 8.2.0.
Affected versions and mitigation
From the CVE record and the vendor's references.Affected
- < 8.2.0
Fixed in 8.2.0
Mitigation
Upgrade openemr to 8.2.0 or later.
References
- Vendor advisory github.com/openemr/openemr/security/advisories…
- Patch github.com/openemr/openemr/pull/12766
- Patch github.com/openemr/openemr/commit/406bb7015e89…
1 more
- Release notes github.com/openemr/openemr/releases/tag/v8_2_0
Timeline
Days relative to CVE publicationNo public PoC found yet; not in CISA KEV.
PoC repositories
Found on GitHub.No PoC repositories found yet.