Hitoshyamamoto soapbar
soapbar: verify_envelope_bsp accepts an unauthenticated embedded certificate (signature forgery / authentication bypass)
soapbar is a SOAP library for Python — client, server, and WSDL handling. Prior to version 0.13.0, verify_envelope_bsp() derived its trust anchor from the message it was verifying. It read the X.509 certificate out of the caller-untrusted wsse:BinarySecurityToken, validated only that certificate's not-before / not-after dates, and then verified the signature against that same certificate. There was no CA-chain validation, no issuer/subject allowlist, and no pinning. A successful verify_envelope_bsp() therefore proved only that the envelope was signed by whoever supplied the embedded certificate — never that it was signed by a trusted party. An attacker who mints their own certificate, signs a forged envelope, and embeds that certificate in the token passes verification. Any consumer that treats a successful BSP verification as authentication can be impersonated (signature forgery / authentication bypass). verify_envelope() (which pins a caller-supplied x509_cert) was not affected — the flaw was specific to the BSP variant whose trust anchor came from the message. This issue has been patched in version 0.13.0.
Affected versions and mitigation
From the CVE record and the vendor's references.Affected
- < 0.13.0
Fixed in 0.13.0
Mitigation
Upgrade soapbar to 0.13.0 or later.
References
- Vendor advisory github.com/hitoshyamamoto/soapbar/security/adv…
- Patch github.com/hitoshyamamoto/soapbar/pull/71
- Release notes github.com/hitoshyamamoto/soapbar/releases/tag…
Timeline
Days relative to CVE publicationNo public PoC found yet; not in CISA KEV.
PoC repositories
Found on GitHub.No PoC repositories found yet.