Yeti
Yeti: Path traversal in ExportTask name allows authenticated arbitrary file read and write
Yeti bridges the gap between CTI and DFIR practitioners by providing a Forensics Intelligence platform and pipeline. Prior to 2.5.1, YETI derives ExportTask.file_name from the user-controlled task name and passes it to core/clients/file_storage/classes/local_storage.py without sanitizing traversal sequences or enforcing path confinement. A low-privileged authenticated user using the default local storage backend can call POST /api/v2/tasks/export/new with a traversal name and use ExportTask.file_contents through GET /api/v2/tasks/export/{export_id}/content to read files accessible to the YETI service account. Running ExportTask.run() can also write attacker-controlled export output to an attacker-selected writable path. The impact depends on the service account's filesystem permissions, and universal code execution is not established. This issue is fixed in version 2.5.1.
Affected versions and mitigation
From the CVE record and the vendor's references.Affected
- <= 2.5.0
Mitigation
The record names no fix. Check the vendor advisory below.
References
- Vendor advisory github.com/yeti-platform/yeti/security/advisor…
- Patch github.com/yeti-platform/yeti/pull/1280
- Patch github.com/yeti-platform/yeti/commit/bfd7c2424…
1 more
- Release notes github.com/yeti-platform/yeti/releases/tag/2.5…
Timeline
Days relative to CVE publicationNo public PoC found yet; not in CISA KEV.
PoC repositories
Found on GitHub.No PoC repositories found yet.