Yeti
Yeti: Authenticated AQL injection via unvalidated search sorting and filter_aliases parameters
Yeti bridges the gap between CTI and DFIR practitioners by providing a Forensics Intelligence platform and pipeline. In version 2.5.0 and earlier, YETI directly interpolates user-controlled sorting fields and filter_aliases attribute paths into ArangoDB AQL identifier and expression positions in core/database_arango.py. A low-privileged authenticated user can send crafted values to POST /api/v2/observables/search, POST /api/v2/entities/search, POST /api/v2/indicators/search, POST /api/v2/dfiq/search, POST /api/v2/search/, or POST /api/v2/graph/search, causing attacker-controlled AQL subexpressions to be parsed and evaluated. This can provide an error oracle, evaluate expressions against internal collections such as users, alter intended search logic, enumerate schema information, and consume excessive database resources. The verified injection points are read and search contexts, so arbitrary database writes are not established. No fixed version is available as of this review.
Affected versions and mitigation
From the CVE record and the vendor's references.Affected
- <= 2.5.0
Mitigation
The record names no fix. Check the vendor advisory below.
References
- Vendor advisory github.com/yeti-platform/yeti/security/advisor…
- Patch github.com/yeti-platform/yeti/pull/1277
- Patch github.com/yeti-platform/yeti/commit/89d8b61cf…
1 more
- Release notes github.com/yeti-platform/yeti/releases/tag/2.5…
Timeline
Days relative to CVE publicationNo public PoC found yet; not in CISA KEV.
PoC repositories
Found on GitHub.No PoC repositories found yet.