Mtzanidakis praktor
praktor: Telegram upload traversal permits persistent agent instruction injection
praktor is a multi-agent Claude Code orchestrator with Telegram input and output, Docker isolation, and a Mission Control UI. Prior to 0.9.1, both Telegram upload sites in `internal/telegram/bot.go` concatenate the attacker-controlled document filename into a destination path without sanitization, and `path.Join` collapses parent-directory traversal. A remote Telegram user who can message the bot can therefore write outside `uploads/` within the persistent agent workspace mounted at `/workspace/agent`. Because `allow_from: []` permits all senders by default, no prior authentication or privilege is required in that configuration. The attacker can plant or overwrite `CLAUDE.md`, instruction, skill, hook, or configuration files that the Claude agent reads and operates on across later runs, turning a document upload into stored instruction injection. The demonstrated arbitrary-write scope is the persistent agent workspace volume, not an unrestricted host-filesystem write. This issue is fixed in version 0.9.1.
Affected versions and mitigation
From the CVE record and the vendor's references.Affected
- < 0.9.1
Fixed in 0.9.1
Mitigation
Upgrade praktor to 0.9.1 or later.
References
- Vendor advisory github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor/security/adviso…
- Patch github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor/pull/228
- Patch github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor/commit/c3731eed…
1 more
- Release notes github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor/releases/tag/v0…
Timeline
Days relative to CVE publicationNo public PoC found yet; not in CISA KEV.
PoC repositories
Found on GitHub.No PoC repositories found yet.