Kcp-dev kcp
kcp front-proxy does not strip inbound X-Remote-* identity headers, allowing any authenticated client to inject groups/warrants and impersonate system:masters in any workspace
kcp is a Kubernetes-like control plane for form-factors and use-cases beyond Kubernetes and container workloads. Prior to 0.31.4 and 0.32.2, the kcp front-proxy does not remove inbound X-Remote-User, X-Remote-Group, or X-Remote-Extra-* identity headers before forwarding requests to shards. Any authenticated tenant can inject X-Remote-Group: system:masters, authorization.kcp.io/warrant, authentication.kcp.io/scopes, or a group used for per-workspace required-group gating, and the shard trusts these values as authenticated identity assertions. This allows cross-workspace impersonation, authorization bypass, and arbitrary reading, writing, or deletion of resources, secrets, RBAC data, APIExports, APIBindings, and LogicalClusters. This issue is fixed in versions 0.31.4 and 0.32.2.
Affected versions and mitigation
From the CVE record and the vendor's references.Affected
- < 0.31.4
- >= 0.32.0, < 0.32.2
Fixed in 0.31.4, 0.32.2
Mitigation
Upgrade kcp to 0.31.4 or 0.32.2 or later.
References
- Vendor advisory github.com/kcp-dev/kcp/security/advisories/GHS…
- Patch github.com/kcp-dev/kcp/commit/7437cdcfec8f927d…
- Patch github.com/kcp-dev/kcp/commit/f913ee890fb2fd9f…
2 more
- Release notes github.com/kcp-dev/kcp/releases/tag/v0.31.4
- Release notes github.com/kcp-dev/kcp/releases/tag/v0.32.2
Timeline
Days relative to CVE publicationNo public PoC found yet; not in CISA KEV.
PoC repositories
Found on GitHub.No PoC repositories found yet.