OpenHop
OpenHop: Path Traversal in Flow ID File Operations
OpenHop is a tool for creating interactive data-flow diagrams. Prior to 0.3.7, `@openhop/server` passes unauthenticated flow route parameters from `GET /api/flows/:id` and `DELETE /api/flows/:id` in `packages/server/src/routes.ts` to `FlowStore.filePath()` in `packages/server/src/store.ts` without an identifier allow-list. The router applies `decodeURIComponent` to the id, and `path.join()` then normalizes traversal outside the configured flow directory after appending the .yaml extension. An attacker can read accessible YAML files as YAML-parsed JSON or permanently delete accessible .yaml files outside that directory, exposing configuration or secrets and disrupting dependent services. In `packages/server/src/index.ts`, CORS `origin: true` permits any browser origin, enabling a malicious webpage to target a loopback-bound instance. Docker deployments default to `HOST=0.0.0.0` and permit direct unauthenticated network access. This issue is fixed in repository release 0.3.7.
Affected versions and mitigation
From the CVE record and the vendor's references.Affected
- < 0.3.7
Fixed in 0.3.7
Mitigation
Upgrade openhop to 0.3.7 or later.
References
- Vendor advisory github.com/naorsabag/openhop/security/advisori…
- Patch github.com/naorsabag/openhop/pull/190
- Patch github.com/naorsabag/openhop/commit/c8190fbefa…
1 more
- Release notes github.com/naorsabag/openhop/releases/tag/v0.3…
Timeline
Days relative to CVE publicationNo public PoC found yet; not in CISA KEV.
PoC repositories
Found on GitHub.No PoC repositories found yet.