Naranor agent-coderag
CodeRAG: Gradle Wrapper Execution During Dependency Discovery Enables Arbitrary Code Execution
CodeRAG is a lightweight semantic code search and distillation utility for AI coding agents. Prior to 1.3.1, the default agent-coderag sync flow in code_rag/entry/cli.py calls sync_dependencies for an indexed path, and code_rag/core/manager.py treats build.gradle or build.gradle.kts as sufficient to invoke _sync_gradle. _sync_gradle prefers a repository-controlled gradlew or gradlew.bat file and passes it directly to asyncio.create_subprocess_exec with the repository root as the working directory; validate_path in code_rag/core/utils.py constrains the directory location but does not validate the executable's content or integrity. A victim who indexes an attacker-controlled Gradle repository therefore executes attacker-supplied code with the victim's operating-system privileges, allowing disclosure, modification, persistence, or denial of service in the user environment. This issue is fixed in 1.3.1.
Affected versions and mitigation
From the CVE record and the vendor's references.Affected
- < 1.3.1
Fixed in 1.3.1
Mitigation
Upgrade agent-coderag to 1.3.1 or later.
References
- Vendor advisory github.com/naranor/agent-coderag/security/advi…
- Patch github.com/naranor/agent-coderag/commit/1d9175…
- Release notes github.com/naranor/agent-coderag/releases/tag/…
Timeline
Days relative to CVE publicationNo public PoC found yet; not in CISA KEV.
PoC repositories
Found on GitHub.No PoC repositories found yet.