Flytohub flyto-core
Flyto2 Core: SSRF guard bypass via IPv6 transition addresses (IPv4-mapped / 6to4 / NAT64) in validate_url_ssrf
Flyto2 Core is an execution kernel for automation and AI-agent workflows. Prior to 2.26.3, validate_url_ssrf and is_private_ip in src/core/utils.py compare resolved addresses only against native private IPv4 and IPv6 ranges and do not unwrap IPv4-mapped, IPv4-compatible, 6to4, or NAT64 transition addresses. An authenticated workflow author can provide a transition-form literal URL through the Execution API POST /v1/execute route, http.get, or sibling guarded outbound-request modules, causing the guard to accept an address whose embedded IPv4 points to loopback, RFC 1918, or cloud metadata services. On a host that routes the selected transition form, the outbound request reaches the internal destination and returns the response body to the workflow caller, enabling read SSRF and disclosure of internal-service data or cloud credentials. This issue is fixed in version 2.26.3.
Affected versions and mitigation
From the CVE record and the vendor's references.Affected
- < 2.26.3
Fixed in 2.26.3
Mitigation
Upgrade flyto-core to 2.26.3 or later.
References
- Vendor advisory github.com/flytohub/flyto-core/security/adviso…
- Patch github.com/flytohub/flyto-core/pull/20
- Patch github.com/flytohub/flyto-core/commit/519e0403…
1 more
- Release notes github.com/flytohub/flyto-core/releases/tag/v2…
Timeline
Days relative to CVE publicationNo public PoC found yet; not in CISA KEV.
PoC repositories
Found on GitHub.No PoC repositories found yet.