free5GC
free5GC AUSF authentication contexts can be overwritten by concurrent requests for the same SUPI
free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network. In version 1.4.4 and earlier, the AUSF component stores per-subscriber authentication state in a global sync.Map named AUSFContext.UePool in internal/context/context.go, keyed only by SUPI. Every request handled by internal/sbi/processor/ue_authentication.go creates an AusfUeContext, and AddAusfUeContextToPool executes ausfContext.UePool.Store(ausfUeContext.Supi, ausfUeContext), unconditionally replacing the active context for that SUPI. An attacker with access to the AUSF SBI/N12 interface can send concurrent POST /nausf-auth/v1/ue-authentications requests for the same target SUPI, causing all attempts to share one logical authentication context URL while K_aut, XRES, and EapID are repeatedly overwritten. A valid EAP-AKA' response for an earlier challenge is then checked against the latest context, causing AT_MAC verification to fail and denying authentication to the selected subscriber while the request flood continues. No fixed version is available as of this review.
Affected versions and mitigation
From the CVE record, GitHub Security Advisories and the vendor's references.Affected
- <= 1.4.4
Mitigation
The record names no fix. Check the vendor advisory below.
References
- Vendor advisory github.com/free5gc/free5gc/security/advisories…
Timeline
Days relative to CVE publicationNo public PoC found yet; not in CISA KEV.
PoC repositories
Found on GitHub.No PoC repositories found yet.