That1Drifter browse-mcp
browse-mcp: Arbitrary file write via unconfined download and state paths
browse-mcp is a Playwright-based headless-browser MCP server for MCP-capable agents. Prior to 0.8.2, browser_download writes a fetched response body to join(save_dir, filename) without validating the caller-controlled save_dir, while browser_save_state and browser_load_state honor a caller-controlled path unchanged. A malicious MCP client, or an autonomous agent steered by indirect prompt injection on a visited page, can choose an arbitrary save_dir or state path and a URL whose response body becomes attacker-controlled file contents, allowing writes to any path the process can reach, including ~/.bashrc, autostart entries, or cron files, and potentially leading to host code execution. The force_fetch fallback also uses a raw fetch() that bypasses the BROWSE_MCP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS origin fence. This issue is fixed in version 0.8.2.
Affected versions and mitigation
From the CVE record and the vendor's references.Affected
- < 0.8.2
Fixed in 0.8.2
Mitigation
Upgrade browse-mcp to 0.8.2 or later.
References
- Vendor advisory github.com/That1Drifter/browse-mcp/security/ad…
- Patch github.com/That1Drifter/browse-mcp/pull/58
- Patch github.com/That1Drifter/browse-mcp/commit/5352…
2 more
- Release notes github.com/That1Drifter/browse-mcp/blob/v0.8.2…
- Release notes github.com/That1Drifter/browse-mcp/releases/ta…
Timeline
Days relative to CVE publicationNo public PoC found yet; not in CISA KEV.
PoC repositories
Found on GitHub.No PoC repositories found yet.