Shriyanss js-recon
JS Recon: Command injection in PR Branch Checker workflow via untrusted pull request context values
JS Recon is a JavaScript enumeration and SAST tool. From 1.2.1-beta.1 until 1.3.1-beta.2, the PR Branch Checker workflow in .github/workflows/pr_checker.yml places github.head_ref and github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name into BRANCH_NAME and SOURCE_REPO and interpolates those untrusted values into a shell gh pr comment command. A remote user who opens a pull request can use shell metacharacters in a branch or fork name to execute commands in the GitHub Actions runner with the workflow's GITHUB_TOKEN, which has pull-requests write permission. This issue is fixed in version 1.3.1-beta.2.
Affected versions and mitigation
From the CVE record and the vendor's references.Affected
- >= 1.2.1-beta.1, < 1.3.1-beta.2
Fixed in 1.3.1-beta.2
Mitigation
Upgrade js-recon to 1.3.1-beta.2 or later.
References
- Vendor advisory github.com/js-recon/js-recon/security/advisori…
- Patch github.com/js-recon/js-recon/pull/121
- Patch github.com/js-recon/js-recon/commit/447876c4bf…
1 more
- Release notes github.com/js-recon/js-recon/releases/tag/v1.3…
Timeline
Days relative to CVE publicationNo public PoC found yet; not in CISA KEV.
PoC repositories
Found on GitHub.No PoC repositories found yet.