Leshchenko1979 fast-mcp-telegram
SSRF via DNS-resolution gap in _validate_url_security (file download by URL)
fast-mcp-telegram is a Telegram MCP Server. Prior to version 30.1, the send_message/send_message_to_phone MCP tools accept files as a list of http(s) URLs, which the server downloads and attaches to the outgoing Telegram message. Downloads are guarded by _validate_url_security, an SSRF denylist that checks the URL's literal hostname string but never resolves DNS. The fetch (httpx.AsyncClient.get) does its own resolution at request time. Consequently a hostname that resolves to a loopback / private / link-local address passes the guard and is fetched — even with the secure defaults block_private_ips=True and allow_http_urls=False. Because the fetched body is returned to the attacker as a Telegram file attachment, this is a full-read, exfiltrating SSRF, not blind. This issue has been patched in version 30.1.
Affected versions and mitigation
From the CVE record and the vendor's references.Affected
- < 30.1
Fixed in 30.1
Mitigation
Upgrade fast-mcp-telegram to 30.1 or later.
References
- Vendor advisory github.com/leshchenko1979/fast-mcp-telegram/se…
- Patch github.com/leshchenko1979/fast-mcp-telegram/co…
- Release notes github.com/leshchenko1979/fast-mcp-telegram/re…
Timeline
Days relative to CVE publicationNo public PoC found yet; not in CISA KEV.
PoC repositories
Found on GitHub.No PoC repositories found yet.