Forgekeep nebula-mesh
nebula-mesh: CA private key not zeroized on web mobile-bundle error paths
nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh VPN. Prior to version 0.3.8, the web handler renderMobileBundle passes the real *pki.CAResolver directly into mobilebundle.Build. Inside Build, resolver.LoadByID decrypts the CA's ed25519 private key into a *pki.CAManager, but Build never calls CAManager.Wipe() on any return path. As a result, when a mobile-bundle request goes through the web UI and Build returns — especially on error (missing network, invalid prefix, DB error, signing failure) — the plaintext CA private key remains on the Go heap, unwiped, until garbage collection. An attacker able to read process memory (core dump, swap, memory-scraping) can recover the CA signing key, which would allow minting arbitrary host certificates for the mesh. The API handler already does this correctly: it loads the CAManager, defer caMgr.Wipe(), and wraps it in caManagerResolver. Only the web path is affected. This issue has been patched in version 0.3.8.
Affected versions and mitigation
From the CVE record and the vendor's references.Affected
- < 0.3.8
Fixed in 0.3.8
Mitigation
Upgrade nebula-mesh to 0.3.8 or later.
References
- Vendor advisory github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh/security/advi…
- Patch github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh/commit/1f1ab9…
- Release notes github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh/releases/tag/…
Timeline
Days relative to CVE publicationNo public PoC found yet; not in CISA KEV.
PoC repositories
Found on GitHub.No PoC repositories found yet.