Samly
Missing one-time-use enforcement in Samly allows replay of SAML bearer assertions
Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in dropbox samly allows an attacker to authenticate as the subject of a captured SAML assertion by resubmitting it. Samly.Helper.decode_idp_auth_resp/3 in lib/samly/helper.ex calls esaml_sp:validate_assertion/2, whose default duplicate detector is a no-op. The /3 arity accepting a DuplicateFun exists in esaml and implements the check, but Samly never calls it and offers no configuration to supply one, so the SAML 2.0 Web Browser SSO Profile requirement that a bearer assertion be used once is unenforced. An attacker holding a valid SAMLResponse obtained from the network, from browser history, or from logs can submit the identical bytes repeatedly until the assertion's NotOnOrAfter passes, each time establishing a session as the assertion's subject. This issue affects samly: from 0.3.0 onward.
Affected versions and mitigation
From the CVE record and the vendor's references.Affected
- >= 0.3.0, < *
Fixed in *
- >= 8a5bb1b4a4753d05470da2036323477f63cfdf4c, < *
Fixed in *
- >= 8a5bb1b4a4753d05470da2036323477f63cfdf4c, < *
Fixed in *
Mitigation
Upgrade samly to * or later.
Upgrade samly to * or later.
Upgrade samly to * or later.
References
Timeline
Days relative to CVE publicationNo public PoC found yet; not in CISA KEV.
PoC repositories
Found on GitHub.No PoC repositories found yet.