Linux
vsock/virtio: fix zerocopy completion for multi-skb sends
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vsock/virtio: fix zerocopy completion for multi-skb sends When a large message is fragmented into multiple skbs, the zerocopy uarg is only allocated and attached to the last skb in the loop. Non-final skbs carry pinned user pages with no completion tracking, so the kernel has no way to notify userspace when those pages are safe to reuse. If the loop breaks early the uarg is never allocated at all, leaking pinned pages with no completion notification. Fix this by following the approach used by TCP: allocate the zerocopy uarg (if not provided by the caller) before the send loop and attach it to every skb via skb_zcopy_set(), which takes a reference per skb. Each skb's completion properly decrements the refcount, and the notification only fires after the last skb is freed. On failure, if no data was sent, the uarg is cleanly aborted via net_zcopy_put_abort(). This issue was initially discovered by sashiko while reviewing commit 1cb36e252211 ("vsock/virtio: fix MSG_ZEROCOPY pinned-pages accounting") but was pre-existing.
Affected versions and mitigation
From the CVE record and the vendor's references.Affected
- >= 581512a6dc939ef122e49336626ae159f3b8a345, < 293fe8f2d1b5ac464ca16a8eba09571bbbb34ba9
- >= 581512a6dc939ef122e49336626ae159f3b8a345, < 76b995bc57bd90cb6e954e1966fbd8786da47f0d
- >= 581512a6dc939ef122e49336626ae159f3b8a345, < b3155f2b78db21e99256bcf7eb902f24ff6d5338
- >= 581512a6dc939ef122e49336626ae159f3b8a345, < ae38d9179190a956e2a87a69ef1dd6f451b51c4d
Fixed in 293fe8f2d1b5ac464ca16a8eba09571bbbb34ba9, 76b995bc57bd90cb6e954e1966fbd8786da47f0d, b3155f2b78db21e99256bcf7eb902f24ff6d5338, ae38d9179190a956e2a87a69ef1dd6f451b51c4d
- 6.7
Fixed in 0, 6.12.97, 6.18.34, 7.0.11, 7.1
Mitigation
Upgrade Linux to 293fe8f2d1b5ac464ca16a8eba09571bbbb34ba9 or 76b995bc57bd90cb6e954e1966fbd8786da47f0d or b3155f2b78db21e99256bcf7eb902f24ff6d5338 or ae38d9179190a956e2a87a69ef1dd6f451b51c4d or later.
Upgrade Linux to 0 or 6.12.97 or 6.18.34 or 7.0.11 or 7.1 or later.
Timeline
Days relative to CVE publicationFirst public PoC 37 days after publication; not in CISA KEV. First PoC: HackSpeak/CVE-2026-53365 (created 19 Aug 2026, found by us: backfilled).
PoC repositories
Found on GitHub.2 PoCs · 1 pending · 1 suspicious or fake
PoCs 2
| Repository | Created | Found by us | Stars | Assessment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| HackSpeak/CVE-2026-53365 | 19 Aug 2026 +37 d | backfilled | 5 | PoC
Flags · score 15
Below the suspicion threshold (50); does not change the assessment. |
| hoodoer/VsockDrop-Adapted-CVE-2026-53365 | 16 Oct 2026 +94 d | 14 Nov 2026 | 0 | PoC |
Pending 1
| Repository | Created | Stars | Assessment |
|---|---|---|---|
| MaherAzzouzi/vsockdrop | 14 Aug 2026 +32 d | 46 | Pending |
Suspicious or fake 1
| Repository | Created | Stars | Assessment |
|---|---|---|---|
| HORKimhab/CVE-2026-53365 | 14 Aug 2026 +32 d | 0 | Fake |
Only PoCs count toward the first-PoC date and the characteristics below. "Backfilled" means we found the repository more than 30 days after it was created. Do not run PoC code from unknown sources.