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Pipelines-as-code: openshift-pipelines-operator-rh: pipelines-as-code: repository users can trigger namespace edit-equivalent execution via auto-provisioned pipeline serviceaccount
A flaw was found in OpenShift Pipelines-as-Code (PAC). PAC does not verify whether the creator of a Repository custom resource has permission to create PipelineRuns. A namespace user with only Repository and Secret create/delete permissions can cause PAC to execute attacker-controlled PipelineRuns as the auto-provisioned pipeline ServiceAccount, which carries ClusterRole/edit by default. This results in namespace-scoped privilege escalation, enabling Secret read, resource creation/modification/deletion, and potential supply chain injection in CI/CD namespaces.
Affected versions and mitigation
From the CVE record and the vendor's references.Affected
- < 0.42.4
- >= 0.43.0, < 0.48.2
- >= 0.49.0, < 0.50.1
Fixed in 0.42.4, 0.48.2, 0.50.1
Mitigation
Upgrade the affected product to 0.42.4 or 0.48.2 or 0.50.1 or later.
Workaround
Set legacyPipelineRbac to false in the TektonConfig custom resource. This prevents the OpenShift Pipelines operator from auto-provisioning the openshift-pipelines-edit RoleBinding that grants the pipeline ServiceAccount ClusterRole/edit in every namespace. Warning: this may break existing pipelines that rely on the pipeline ServiceAccount having edit permissions. Simply deleting the openshift-pipelines-edit RoleBinding is NOT sufficient — the operator reconciliation loop will re-create it unless legacyPipelineRbac is set to false.
References
Timeline
Days relative to CVE publicationNo public PoC found yet; not in CISA KEV.
PoC repositories
Found on GitHub.No PoC repositories found yet.