A2a-java a2a-java-sdk-http-client
JDK HTTP client GET/DELETE follow cross-authority redirects with injected client, leaking API-key headers (POST-only gap)
The core JDK HTTP client (a2a-java-sdk-http-client) applies the GHSA-9rhm redirect-neutralization only to the POST path. JdkGetBuilder.get(), JdkGetBuilder.getAsyncSSE(), and JdkDeleteBuilder.delete() call the injected httpClient directly, with no redirect gate. An application that supplies a redirect-capable HttpClient (Redirect.NORMAL/ALWAYS) — which is the SDK-documented way to enable POST redirects — silently follows cross-authority redirects on every credentialed GET/DELETE request. The JDK strips Authorization cross-origin, but forwards the four allowlisted custom credential headers (X-API-Key, API-Key, X-Auth-Token, X-Authentication) to the attacker-controlled authority. This is an incomplete-fix variant of GHSA-9rhm: the fix hardened the default client and added a POST-only two-step opt-in, but never covered GET/DELETE.
Affected versions and mitigation
From the CVE record and the vendor's references.Affected
- >= 1.3.0.Final, <= 1.4.0.Final
Mitigation
Upgrade to 1.5.0.Final or later. PR #1257 routes JDK GET, DELETE, and SSE requests through a client with native redirects disabled. Synchronous GET redirects are handled explicitly by the SDK using the shared RedirectHeaderPolicy; streaming requests do not follow redirects. The reporter reviewed the proposed fix and confirmed that it addresses the reported issue.
Workaround
On affected versions, supply a JDK HttpClient configured with HttpClient.Redirect.NEVER to prevent automatic redirect following.
References
- Vendor advisory github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/security/adviso…
Timeline
Days relative to CVE publicationNo public PoC found yet; not in CISA KEV.
PoC repositories
Found on GitHub.No PoC repositories found yet.