Os85 httpx
Insecure deserializaiton in the httpx Ruby gem via unsafe Oj object-mode
The httpx Ruby gem parses JSON response bodies through its transcoder layer. HTTPX::Response#json delegates to Transcoder::JSON.decode, and when the oj gem is loaded and multi_json is absent, the decoder falls back to json_load, which calls Oj.load(response.to_s) with no mode option. Oj.load defaults to :object mode, in which a response document can allocate any already-loaded Ruby class ("^o":"ClassName") and set its instance variables, or resolve a class or module reference ("^c":"Name"). An attacker who controls, or can influence, the URL an application fetches with HTTPX.get(url).json therefore controls object instantiation in the victim process. With a matching gadget chain, this issue can potentially cause remote code execution. Affects httpx 1.9.0; fixed in 1.9.1.
Affected versions and mitigation
From the CVE record and the vendor's references.Affected
- >= 1.9.0, < 1.9.1
Fixed in 1.9.1
Mitigation
Upgrade to httpx 1.9.1, which calls Oj.load with an explicit { mode: :strict } default. If upgrading is not possible, pass a safe mode at the call site (response.json(mode: :strict)), or set a safe process-wide default such as Oj.default_options = { mode: :strict } (or :rails) before any untrusted JSON is parsed. Do not rely on Oj's shipped :object default for data that arrived over the network.
References
Timeline
Days relative to CVE publicationNo public PoC found yet; not in CISA KEV.
PoC repositories
Found on GitHub.No PoC repositories found yet.