Cookpete auto-changelog
auto-changelog: code execution via untrusted in-repository configuration (handlebarsSetup/plugins), plus argument injection, path traversal, and SSRF
auto-changelog before 2.6.1 merges configuration from inside the target repository (the .auto-changelog file and the auto-changelog key in package.json) into its options, and honors security-sensitive options from that untrusted source. The handlebarsSetup option is passed to require(), so running auto-changelog over attacker-controlled repository content (for example, in a CI workflow that checks out an untrusted pull request head, or locally on a forked or third-party repository) executes attacker-chosen code with the privileges of the invoking user or CI job, including access to workflow secrets, without the repository dependencies ever being installed. The plugins option similarly loads attacker-controlled modules from the repository. Under the same conditions, appendGitLog/appendGitTag allow git argument injection (e.g. --output= to write arbitrary files), output allows writing attacker-influenced content to arbitrary paths, and template causes an outbound request to an attacker-chosen URL. Version 2.6.1 treats in-repository configuration as untrusted and refuses to run when it sets these options, unless the new --unsafe-config flag is passed.
Affected versions and mitigation
From the CVE record and the vendor's references.Affected
- < 2.6.1
Fixed in 2.6.1
Mitigation
Upgrade to auto-changelog 2.6.1 or later. Options that load code, inject git arguments, write outside the repository, or fetch URLs must now be passed on the command line; `--unsafe-config` restores the old behavior for fully trusted repositories only.
Workaround
Do not run auto-changelog over untrusted repository content, including CI workflows that check out pull request heads from forks.
References
Timeline
Days relative to CVE publicationNo public PoC found yet; not in CISA KEV.
PoC repositories
Found on GitHub.No PoC repositories found yet.