Echo
Echo: Rejected WebSocket upgrades can bypass Echo route-level access controls
Echo is a Go web framework. From 4.0.0 until 4.16.1 and 5.4.1, Echo's Proxy middleware selects a raw tunnel from a client WebSocket upgrade request before verifying that the configured upstream accepted the upgrade. If the upstream rejects the upgrade with an ordinary keep-alive response, later HTTP requests on the connection are sent directly to that upstream without passing through Echo's router or route-specific middleware. This can bypass authentication or authorization enforced only by Echo routes, but requires an accessible proxy route, a cooperating rejected-upgrade response, and a target without independent upstream authorization. This issue is fixed in 4.16.1 and 5.4.1.
Affected versions and mitigation
From the CVE record and the vendor's references.Affected
- >= 4.0.0, < 4.16.1
- >= 5.0.0, < 5.4.1
Fixed in 4.16.1, 5.4.1
Mitigation
Upgrade echo to 4.16.1 or 5.4.1 or later.
References
- Vendor advisory github.com/labstack/echo/security/advisories/G…
- Patch github.com/labstack/echo/commit/1855061e572ae9…
- Patch github.com/labstack/echo/commit/3fb0ba7e17645b…
2 more
- Release notes github.com/labstack/echo/releases/tag/v4.16.1
- Release notes github.com/labstack/echo/releases/tag/v5.4.1
Timeline
Days relative to CVE publicationNo public PoC found yet; not in CISA KEV.
PoC repositories
Found on GitHub.No PoC repositories found yet.