Bandit
SETTINGS and stream-0 WINDOW_UPDATE frames trigger quadratic work over blocked streams in Bandit
Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity vulnerability in the HTTP/2 implementation of mtrudel bandit allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to exhaust server CPU via small SETTINGS or connection-level WINDOW_UPDATE frames. The attacker opens thousands of streams whose responses block on the connection send window, then sends cheap frames that each make the server walk the whole queue of blocked sends. In the reporter's run, with 3,000 blocked streams a single 9-byte SETTINGS frame took 133 ms to process. do_pending_sends/2 in lib/bandit/http2/connection.ex retries every queued send and, before each retry, removes that entry from the queue with List.delete/2, so one frame costs O(n²) list operations for n blocked streams. max_concurrent_streams defaults to :infinity, so the attacker chooses n. This issue affects bandit: from 0.3.4 before 1.14.0.
Affected versions and mitigation
From the CVE record and the vendor's references.Affected
- >= 0.3.4, < 1.14.0
Fixed in 1.14.0
- >= 6feadb31189d18b7dcda6c663112cd3bbaf63a46, < 220b9dfd27f9a21305be2afc75cbe585ddc24e7a
Fixed in 220b9dfd27f9a21305be2afc75cbe585ddc24e7a
Mitigation
Upgrade bandit to 1.14.0 or later.
Upgrade bandit to 220b9dfd27f9a21305be2afc75cbe585ddc24e7a or later.
Workaround
From 1.9.0, bound the number of streams a client can open, for example with http_2_options: [default_local_settings: [max_concurrent_streams: 100]], which bounds the work each frame can cause. From 0.7.0, disabling HTTP/2 with http_2_options: [enabled: false] removes the vulnerable path.
References
Timeline
Days relative to CVE publicationNo public PoC found yet; not in CISA KEV.
PoC repositories
Found on GitHub.No PoC repositories found yet.