Anthropic @anthropic-ai/claude-code
Arbitrary File Write via Write-Time Symlink Following (TOCTOU) in Claude Code
Claude Code validated that a target file path resided within the project working directory at permission-check time, but re-resolved the path at write time without repeating that validation. This time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU) gap allowed an attacker who could write to the workspace to atomically replace a project file with a symlink, causing Claude Code to follow the symlink and write its output to an arbitrary file outside the project sandbox. Exploitation required the ability to win a race condition against the write operation and write access to the shared workspace, enabling a lower-privileged attacker to redirect benign edits to sensitive files (e.g., shell configuration) in a higher-privileged session. Users on standard Claude Code auto-update have received this fix already. Users performing manual updates are advised to update to the latest version. Thank you to hackerone.com/c_h4ck_0 for reporting this issue.
Affected versions and mitigation
From the CVE record and the vendor's references.Affected
- < 2.1.129
Fixed in 2.1.129
Mitigation
Upgrade @anthropic-ai/claude-code to 2.1.129 or later.
References
- Vendor advisory github.com/anthropics/claude-code/security/adv…
Timeline
Days relative to CVE publicationNo public PoC found yet; not in CISA KEV.
PoC repositories
Found on GitHub.No PoC repositories found yet.