Red Hat Advanced Cluster Security for Kubernetes 4.10
Stackrox: stackrox: saml response replay allows multiple central authentication tokens
A flaw was found in Red Hat Advanced Cluster Security for Kubernetes (RHACS). The Central SAML authentication ACS endpoint does not retain used SAML assertion or response identifiers to prevent replay. An attacker who obtains a valid, unexpired signed SAML response can submit it multiple times and receive distinct Central authentication tokens for the mapped identity.
Affected versions and mitigation
From the CVE record and the vendor's references.Affected
Fixed in 1793184257
Fixed in 1792492060
Mitigation
Upgrade Red Hat Advanced Cluster Security for Kubernetes 4.10 to 1793184257 or later.
Upgrade Red Hat Advanced Cluster Security for Kubernetes 4.11 to 1792492060 or later.
Workaround
Until an update is available, restrict network access to the Central SAML ACS endpoint to trusted identity providers and networks, and reduce SAML assertion lifetimes at the identity provider where possible. --- CME Mitigation Guidance (2026-10-20) --- Disclaimer: The following mitigation solutions are provided as a courtesy, pending the application of an official patch. This content was generated utilizing AI tools in conjunction with data from https://cmetaxonomy.org. Customers are advised to independently evaluate and test these temporary mitigations within their own infrastructure. The highest-value action is to enforce replay tracking on the Central SAML Assertion Consumer Service endpoint to record and reject previously consumed assertion and response identifiers: upgrade to RHACS 4.11.6 (or the fixed Advanced Cluster Security/Rhacs Main Rhel builds), which record and reject previously consumed SAML response and assertion identifiers at the ACS endpoint, closing all 2 injection vectors (SAML response replay, SAML assertion identifier reuse). Until patched, this is only a concern on RHACS Central deployments on Linux with SAML authentication enabled and a reachable ACS endpoint — Deployments that do not use SAML authentication or rely on OIDC ID-token logins are unaffected — so Restrict network access to the Central SAML ACS endpoint to trusted identity providers and networks, and reduce SAML assertion lifetimes at the identity provider. As a compensating measure, Configure host-based firewall rules using firewalld or nftables to restrict reachability to the Central SAML ACS endpoint to authorized identity providers and trusted client subnets and Apply network segmentation via VLANs or subnets to isolate the network path to RHACS Central and restrict reachability to the SAML ACS endpoint. These controls limit blast radius and contain exploitation, but they do not fix the underlying missing SAML replay protection defect — apply the upstream patch to fully remediate. Highest-impact CME: CME-202 Host-Based Firewall (firewalld/nftables) (medium)
References
- Vendor advisory access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:85932
- Vendor advisory access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:92342
Timeline
Days relative to CVE publicationNo public PoC found yet; not in CISA KEV.
PoC repositories
Found on GitHub.No PoC repositories found yet.