Gitea
Gitea migration SSRF through ALLOWED_DOMAINS address check bypass
When `[migrations] ALLOWED_DOMAINS` was configured, a hostname matching the allow list was accepted without checking its resolved address against the local-network restrictions. A user who can start repository migrations and control the DNS of an allowed hostname could make it resolve to loopback or private addresses and bypass `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS = false`, reaching internal services from the Gitea server. Instances without `ALLOWED_DOMAINS` configured are not affected by this specific bypass.
First public PoC
None yetno public PoC found
Public PoCs00 on GitHub
CVSS7.7high · scored by CISA ADP · CWE-346
CISA KEV
Not listednot known exploited
Affected versions and mitigation
From the CVE record and the vendor's references.Affected
Gitea Gitea
- <= 1.27.3
Mitigation
The record names no fix. Check the vendor advisory below.
References
- Vendor advisory github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/…
- Patch github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/39426
- Release notes blog.gitea.com/release-of-28.0.0
1 more
- Release notes github.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v28.0.0
Timeline
Days relative to CVE publicationNo public PoC found yet; not in CISA KEV.
PoC repositories
Found on GitHub.No PoC repositories found yet.