F5 NGINX JavaScript
NGINX ngx_http_js_module vulnerability
Description NGINX JavaScript (njs) has a vulnerability where the njs XML module exposes entity-backed XML attributes inconsistently with libxml2 canonicalization. In both the built-in njs and QuickJS backends during the canonicalization process, the $attr$Name getter may return undefined for an explicitly present attribute containing an internal entity reference. The $attrs getter may return a value derived only from the first attribute child. This may allow an unauthenticated attacker that invests significant effort in obtaining a genuinely signed document to skip validation while signature verification succeeds. An nginx-saml deployment is a confirmed affected consumer when run with the built-in njs backend. Impact In affected signed-XML consumers, an unauthenticated attacker can cause security-relevant attributes to appear absent or truncated while signature verification succeeds. In nginx-saml, this can bypass expiry, Destination, and request-correlation checks, enabling replay or acceptance of a response outside its intended context. It does not permit signature or identity forgery, or a direct availability impact. There is no control plane exposure; this is a data plane issue only. Note: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated.
Affected versions and mitigation
From the CVE record and the vendor's references.Affected
- >= 0.7.10, < 1.0.2
Fixed in 1.0.2
Mitigation
Upgrade NGINX JavaScript to 1.0.2 or later.
Workaround
Applications processing signed XML should reject DTD-bearing input before calling xml.parse(). The check must cover the complete document after decoding its accepted input encoding; a parser-level DTD prohibition is preferable to a raw byte search for "<!DOCTYPE". Applications should also treat absent security-relevant attributes as validation failures rather than optional values. nginx-saml deployments should explicitly validate Destination, request correlation when unsolicited SSO is not intended, assertion validity, bearer SubjectConfirmation, Recipient, and SubjectConfirmationData InResponseTo.
References
- Vendor advisory my.f5.com/manage/s/article/K000162615
Timeline
Days relative to CVE publicationNo public PoC found yet; not in CISA KEV.
PoC repositories
Found on GitHub.No PoC repositories found yet.