{
  "id": "CVE-2026-98069",
  "url": "https://poc.griffinguard.io/cve/CVE-2026-98069",
  "published_at": "2026-09-25T10:24:10.887Z",
  "title": "net/rds: acquire the fastpath locks in rds_conn_shutdown()",
  "vendor": "Linux",
  "product": "Linux",
  "cvss": {
    "score": 8.1,
    "source": "cna",
    "vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
  },
  "kev": {
    "in_kev": false,
    "added_at": null,
    "days_after_publication": null
  },
  "first_poc": null,
  "poc_repo_count": 0,
  "exploit_count": 0,
  "suspicious_repo_count": 0,
  "edge_device": null,
  "description": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/rds: acquire the fastpath locks in rds_conn_shutdown()\n\nrds_conn_shutdown() quiesces the transmit and receive-refill paths by\nwaiting for RDS_IN_XMIT and RDS_RECV_REFILL to be sampled clear, and\nthen runs the transport shutdown and rds_conn_path_reset().  Sampling\nthe bits clear is not the same as owning them: the moment after the\nwait_event() returns, rds_send_xmit() can re-acquire RDS_IN_XMIT (or\nrds_ib_recv_refill() can re-acquire RDS_RECV_REFILL) and run\nconcurrently with the teardown.\n\nThe sender does recheck the connection state after taking the lock,\nbut that recheck is a classic store-buffering pattern: teardown writes\nthe state and reads the bit while the sender writes the bit and reads\nthe state.  acquire_in_xmit() is only an acquire operation, so on\nweakly ordered architectures both sides can miss each other's write,\nand the transmit path then runs while the transport zeroes its rings\n(e.g. rds_ib_ring_init()) and rds_send_path_reset() rewrites the\ntransmit state under it.\n\nOracle UEK fixed the same class of crashes - a 14-year tail of\nBUG_ON()s in rds_ib_sub_signaled(), unexpected op-codes and NULL\ndereferences in rds_ib_send_cqe_handler() during failover testing -\nby making the teardown path *acquire* the fastpath bit locks instead\nof testing them (\"rds: Make sure transmit path and connection\ntear-down does not run concurrently\").  Ownership of a single word is\ndecided by RMW atomicity, so no cross-variable ordering is needed.\n\nDo the same here: take both locks before calling the transport\nshutdown, hold them across rds_conn_path_reset(), and release them\nexplicitly with a wake-up afterwards.  Both are released with\nclear_bit_unlock(), so that the ring re-initialization done by the\ntransport shutdown and the transmit state rewritten by\nrds_send_path_reset() are ordered before either bit is seen clear by\nthe next acquire_in_xmit() or acquire_refill().\n\nThe fastpath users of these bits - rds_send_xmit() and\nrds_ib_recv_refill() - are trylock style and back off while teardown\nowns the locks, so no new lock dependency is introduced for them.\nrds_tcp_reset_callbacks() is different: since the previous patch it\nacquires RDS_IN_XMIT as well, and it blocks doing so, so its wait now\nspans the teardown instead of at most one send batch.  That waiter\nruns from rds_tcp_accept_one() on the single-threaded krdsd workqueue\nand holds rds_tcp_accept_lock and t_conn_path_lock while it waits, so\na duelling SYN accepted while its path is being torn down parks\naccept processing for the duration of the teardown - for TCP bounded\nby the (up to 5 s) drain loop in rds_tcp_conn_path_shutdown().  An IB\npath's drain in rds_ib_conn_path_shutdown() has no round cap, but no\nblocking waiter either: rds_tcp_reset_callbacks() is the only blocking\nacquirer of these bits and waits only on its own TCP path, and the\nfastpaths are trylock-and-back-off on both transports, so a long IB\ndrain lengthens only that path's own quiesce.  The\nwindow is narrow: the accept-side state check has to pass before the\nteardown moves the path to RDS_CONN_DISCONNECTING.\n\nBecause krdsd is a single global workqueue, everything else queued\nthere - accept processing for other connections and network\nnamespaces, and the flush_workqueue(rds_wq) in rds_tcp_listen_stop()\nduring namespace teardown - waits behind the parked accept worker for\nthat time.  It cannot deadlock, although the waits do point at each\nother: the teardown blocks until the bit's holder releases it, and\nthe holder may be that krdsd accept worker.  The holder finishes\nwithout needing anything the teardown owns: the sync cancels\nrds_tcp_reset_callbacks() issues target cp_send_w and cp_recv_w on\nthe path's ordered cp_wq, whose only execution slot is occupied by\nthe blocked cp_down_w itself, so they are pending at most and cancel\nwithout flushing - a reliance on cp_wq being ordered that is now\nnoted next to those cancels (on \n---truncated---",
  "cwe": "CWE-476",
  "cpes": [
    "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
    "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.3:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*"
  ],
  "cvss_by_source": {
    "cna": 8.1
  },
  "repos": [],
  "remediation": {
    "affected": [
      {
        "vendor": "Linux",
        "product": "Linux",
        "ranges": [
          "\u003e= 0f4b1c7e89e699f588807a914ec6e6396c851a72, \u003c 7f4f21e4439df30d9aca9fb3bac38191a2f34729",
          "\u003e= 0f4b1c7e89e699f588807a914ec6e6396c851a72, \u003c 1f900f585cbb0fbe6aa00c31c9f5bb63ee614456",
          "\u003e= 0f4b1c7e89e699f588807a914ec6e6396c851a72, \u003c 32e21bcf4b5b11454bf57c4bb3bf019b71512ace",
          "\u003e= 0f4b1c7e89e699f588807a914ec6e6396c851a72, \u003c 2e46248e375a516301884719f08b6015c79a6456",
          "\u003e= 0f4b1c7e89e699f588807a914ec6e6396c851a72, \u003c 7febb113795d5de5b690b208f4b0e64a5fad1201",
          "\u003e= 0f4b1c7e89e699f588807a914ec6e6396c851a72, \u003c 900e96c9749a06833801f60c393aa1d405ea226c",
          "\u003e= 0f4b1c7e89e699f588807a914ec6e6396c851a72, \u003c 1fe627e5db5c3f53a9f9f9c8a66671755d306955",
          "\u003e= 0f4b1c7e89e699f588807a914ec6e6396c851a72, \u003c 813f3582ac7ae9f60f917937d54660e0952d5f2d"
        ],
        "fixed_in": [
          "7f4f21e4439df30d9aca9fb3bac38191a2f34729",
          "1f900f585cbb0fbe6aa00c31c9f5bb63ee614456",
          "32e21bcf4b5b11454bf57c4bb3bf019b71512ace",
          "2e46248e375a516301884719f08b6015c79a6456",
          "7febb113795d5de5b690b208f4b0e64a5fad1201",
          "900e96c9749a06833801f60c393aa1d405ea226c",
          "1fe627e5db5c3f53a9f9f9c8a66671755d306955",
          "813f3582ac7ae9f60f917937d54660e0952d5f2d"
        ]
      },
      {
        "vendor": "Linux",
        "product": "Linux",
        "ranges": [
          "2.6.37"
        ],
        "fixed_in": [
          "0",
          "5.10.271",
          "5.15.222",
          "6.1.189",
          "6.6.158",
          "6.12.111",
          "6.18.53",
          "7.2.7",
          "7.3"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "upgrade": [
      "Upgrade Linux to 7f4f21e4439df30d9aca9fb3bac38191a2f34729 or 1f900f585cbb0fbe6aa00c31c9f5bb63ee614456 or 32e21bcf4b5b11454bf57c4bb3bf019b71512ace or 2e46248e375a516301884719f08b6015c79a6456 or 7febb113795d5de5b690b208f4b0e64a5fad1201 or 900e96c9749a06833801f60c393aa1d405ea226c or 1fe627e5db5c3f53a9f9f9c8a66671755d306955 or 813f3582ac7ae9f60f917937d54660e0952d5f2d or later.",
      "Upgrade Linux to 0 or 5.10.271 or 5.15.222 or 6.1.189 or 6.6.158 or 6.12.111 or 6.18.53 or 7.2.7 or 7.3 or later."
    ]
  },
  "exploit_refs": [],
  "hunt_profile": [],
  "rules": []
}
